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THE COURTROOM STATUS OF THE POLYGRAPH
Man is a Tool-using Animal... without Tools
he is nothing, with Tools he is all.
Thomas Carlyle
Sartor Resartus
INTRODUCTION
T HE ABOVE QUOTATION is especially true when applied to the criminal
attorney. Among the tools available to him is the polygraph, com-
monly called a "lie detector." But like most tools, the polygraph's usefulness
is limited unless operated by a craftsman who knows when to use it. This
comment will inform the reader of the status and various uses of the poly-
graph available to the criminal attorney, with an emphasis on Ohio law.
I. THE UNDERLYING SCIENTIFIC THEORY
A polygraph is a machine which, according to its proponents, allows
a trained operator to detect lies in the statements of a person attached to
the machine. The polygraph machine used by the Akron Police Department,
for example, consists of a blood pressure cuff similar to that used by a
doctor, two pneumograph tubes (one fastened around the subject's abdomen
to measure stomach breathing and the other attached to his chest to measure
chest breathing) and a galvanic skin reflex unit which electronically measures
sweat gland activities when attached to a person's fingers. Although there
are various types of machines,' the theory behind them is the same:
that there is a definite relationship between willful lying and an eleva-
tion of blood pressure, fluctuations and the depth of respiration and
variations in the resistance to electric current; that such relationship
could be ascertained by means of a polygraph which simultaneously
records these reactions on paper.'
This theory is supported by a concensus of opinion in the medical pro-
fession.' Thus, by interpreting changes which occur in these four measure-
ments as the subject is questioned, the polygraph operator is able to de-
termine the truthfulness of the subject's answers.
Although lying is a voluntary action, a person's physiological reaction
to his lies is not. Whenever someone encounters an emergency situation,
I Some authorities claim that at least two of the mentioned measurements must be taken for
an accurate test. A. MoENssENs, R. MosEs & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFc EVIDENCE IN CRIMiNAL
CASES 541 (1973). Others insist on three measurements. R. ARTHER, THE SCIENTIFIC IN-
VESTGATOR 31 (1965).
2 Testimony of Dr. LeMoyne Snyder paraphrased in People v. Darrs, 343 Mich. 348, 369,
72 N.W.2d 269, 280-81 (1955).
3 id.
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the sympathetic autonomic nervous system becomes activated to help
meet the emergency. This reaction is most noticeable in fear situations.
For example, if a person were to step into the street in front of a truck, he
would receive a rush of energy which would allow him to react quickly.
Safe on the curb, his heart would be pounding ferociously. It was the
autonomic nervous system which increased his heart beat in order to speed
fuel and oxygen throughout his body, thus increasing his speed and strength.
Other organs in the body react in a similar manner.
Being questioned concerning the commission of a crime creates a fear
situation, the fear of being sanctioned. As in the earlier example, the au-
tonomic nervous system is triggered. Respiration, pulse and sweat gland
activity are all affected. But instead of aiding one's escape, these reactions,
when recorded by a polygraph, may cause these fears to be realized.'
Unfortunately, professional acceptance of the theory behind the poly-
graph is not universal. According to Professor Jerome Skolnick:
[T]he scientific basis for lie detection is questionable. There seems to
be little evidence that upholds the claim to a regular relationship be-
tween lying and emotion; there is even less to support the conclusion
that precise inferences can be drawn from the relationship between
emotional change and physiological response.'
Moreover, "the autonomic response to the critical question will always
be influenced by individual difference variables which are not a function
of the subject's guilt or innocence."' For example, being accused of a
crime and taking a polygraph test, whether guilty or not, will in itself
create a fear situation. This would activate one's autonomic nervous system,
and register a response during testing. The extent of the response would
vary with the individual.' On the other hand, a guilty person with no fear
of criminal sanctions may register no response at all. An illustration of
this occurs where a subject is given a placebo and told it will immunize
him from detection; if he believes it, he would 'beat' the test.'
The theory of the polygraph can be impaired by other characteristics
of a test subject. Test results can be detrimentally affected if the subject
4 Testimony of Dr. William Yankee in the case of United States v. Ridling, 350 F.. Supp. 90
(E.D. Mich. 1972) quoted in R. FERGUSON & A. MILLER, POLYGRAPH FOR THE DEFENSE,
(1974).
6Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of.Lie-Detection, 70
YALE LJ. 694, 727 (1961).
6 Lykken, Psychology and the Lie Detection Industry, 29 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 725, 730 (1974).
'Id. at 730, 731. See also F. INBAu, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (2d ed.
1948) cited in State v. Hill, 40 Ohio App. 2d 16, 21-22, 317 NE.2d 233, 237 (1963)., But see
J. REI & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION-THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE DETECTOR") TECH-
NIQUE 216-17 (2d ed. 1977).
* REID & INIIAU, supra note 7, at 213.
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suffers from a heart condition,9 excessively high or low blood pressure,
hiccups, allergies, ° asthma, hay fever, or coughs." The feebleminded and
mentally retarded, 2 morons, psychotics" sociopaths,", psychoneurotics and
psychopaths 5 can all cause test interpretation problems. The potential for er-
ror is increased in tests involving young children,"6 regular drug users who are
presently 'straight,'I T and persons under the influence of drugs 8 or alcohol."'
Other factors include overanxiety, anger,20 concern over a neglected duty
(e.g., a night watchman who was asleep at the time of a burglary may react
to a question because of guilt feelings for letting the theft happen), in-
volvement in similar acts or offenses,2 ' extensive or suggestive prior interro-
gation," prior testing," physical discomfort, 4 adrenal exhaustion from
being tested too soon after an emergency," psychological evasion,"6 ration-
alization and self-deceit." It has been suggested that the polygraph can even
brainwash or subconsciously persuade a subject of his guilt through phy-
siological feedback.' 8
Proponents of the polygraph contend that most of these problems
can be minimized by a properly trained examiner.' However, many of
those proponents concede that there are "relatively few persons holding
themselves out as polygraph examiners who have the required qualifica-
tions."30 Current state regulation provides little help. More than half of
the states, including Ohio, do not have a licensing statute for examiners.
Those states that do issue a license have statutes which are weak, in-
'Id. at 234.
10 Highleyman, The Deceptive Certainty of the "Lie Detector", 10 HASTINGS L.J. 47, 60
(1958).
21 REID & INBAU, supra note 7, at 235.
Ild. at 247.
13 Id. at 248.
14S. ABRAMS, A POLYGRAPH HANDBOOK FOR ATTORNEYS 179 (1977).
15 REID & INBAU, supra note 7, at 250.
24 Id. at 251.
17 Id. at 236.
I ld. at 20, 236.
19 Highleyman, supra note 10, at 60.
20 RErD & INBAU, supra note 7, at 220.
21 Id. at 224.
22 Id. at 226-28.
23 Id. at 226.
24 Id. at 224.
25 Id. at 226-27.
2e Id. at 210.
2 Id. at 227.
.
8 Axelrod, The Use of Lie Detectors by Criminal Defense Attorneys, 3 NAT'L J. CRIM.
DE#. 107, 127-28, (1977).
29 See REID & INBAU, supra note 7.
30 MOSENS, MOSES & INBAU, supra note 1, at 543.
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effective and "generally inadequate in setting standards which would elimi-
nate incompetent examiners.""1
A major problem with licensing statutes is that many of them have
a 'Grandfather Clause' which allows an examiner who practiced polygraphy
before a specified date to continue practicing, regardless of his competence. 2
Although compassionate towards the veteran polygraphist, the clause permits
reliance on a license which has not served its screening function. Licensing
statutes all have minimal training and educational requirements. The prob-
lem is that many simply require a high school diploma,3 despite the fact
that it would take a psychologist or other highly educated professional to
determine if a subject is a psychopath, sociopath, or other psychologically
impaired person.
The scientific basis of the polygraph is further eroded by reliance on
the examiner's subjective evaluation of the test subject. In their widely
read and judicially recognized polygraph handbook, Truth and Deception
-The Polygraph ("Lie-Detector") Technique, Reid and Inbau instruct
examiners to note various listed symptoms of lying and truthfulness. Their
list includes delays in answering a question, attitude towards the test,
body movements, etc." They state that:
No final conclusions should be drawn from the subject's answers or
reactions which we have pointed out as indications of probable de-
ception or truthfulness. Nevertheless, they are very helpful as factors
to be considered in the ultimate decision to be made of truthfulness
or deception. At the very least, they may place the examiner on his
guard against a positive opinion based upon the test results alone
whenever these various pretest answers and reactions point to an
opposite indication.3
Thus, despite claims to the contrary," it appears as if:
the professional polygrapher almost never arrives at his final diagnosis
on the basis of the polygraphic records alone.... [Iln the vast majority
32 Note, Polygraphic Evidence: The Case for Admissibility Upon Stipulation of the Parties,
9 TuLsA LJ. 250, 265 (1973).
82 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 338.1709(a)(i) and (ii).
38OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1458(5) (West).
34 REID & INBAU, supra note 7, at 13, 17-21, 204, 292-96.
- Id. at 23-25. In a polygraph test witnessed by this writer, the test was adjudged inconclu-
sive. The examiner later confided that he personally thought the subject was guilty. However,
he noted various readings on the chart as the basis of his conclusion. Interestingly, the
subject had passed an earlier polygraph test.
86 Horvath and Reid claim a 91.4% accuracy rate for "experienced" examiners evaluating
polygraph charts alone. Horvath & Reid, The Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis of
Truth and Deception, 62 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 276 (1971). Note, however, that one of the
same authors, although careful not to make a fiat assertion, implies a 99% + accuracy rate
when examiners evaluate both charts and subjects. REID & INBAU, supra note 7, at 304.
[Vol. 14:1I
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of field examinations, the final diagnosis results from a subjective
blending in the mind of the examiner of what he has observed in the
charts, in the demeanor of the subject during the test, and in the
preexamination interview, what he knows of the evidence against the
suspect and what he may infer from the suspect's prior history, and
even any prejudices he may hold about the subject's race, age, ap-
pearance, and the like. 7
Obviously, a critique of the polygraph does not leave its basic theory
unscathed; consider this point:
there does not appear to be general scientific acceptance of a theory
to explain all the phenomena of aspirin. But even though aspirin's
theoretical underpinnings may never be elucidated to the satisfaction
of the scientific community, the fact is that it works.38
The next inquiry will be to determine if the same statement can be made
of the polygraph.
Various studies of the polygraph estimate its accuracy from a high
of 100 percent to a low of 63 percent,3" with any errors which occur favoring
the innocent."0 In addition to the doubt generated merely by the large range
of accuracy estimates, there are other reasons for withholding credence in
these studies. Laboratory studies are unreliable because they can not ade-
quately evoke the fear factor on which a diagnosis is made." Actual case
studies can not be properly verified because confessions are rare and not
necessarily reliable. 2 Reference to the findings of the jury does not help
gauge the accuracy of the polygraph. The unreliability of jury findings is
highlighted by the perceived need for some sort of mechanical 'lie detector.'
Thus, all that can safely be said about the accuracy of the polygraph is
that: 1) valid diagnoses of truthfulness are often made; and, 2) errors can
occur.
Even with its shortcomings, the polygraph is a valuable tool for the
criminal attorney in Ohio. Its functions are investigatory, exculpatory and
accusatory. These uses are regulated by the court. The remainder of this
comment will study this regulation.
II. THE GENERAL RULE OF INADMISSIBILITY
The judicial regulation of the polygraph began in 1923, when the
37 Lykken, supra note 6, at 730.
38 Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in Determining Credibility
In a Perjury-Plagued System, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 922 (1975).
39 ABRAMS, supra note 14, at 105 and accompanying materials.
4 MOENSSENS, MOSES & INBAU, supra note 1, at 552.
41 Lykken, supra note 6, at 734.
42 Axelrod, supra note 28, at 132.
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Circuit Court for the District of Columbia held in Frye v. United States s
that polygraphic evidence is not generally admissible at trial. The defendant
in Frye attempted to introduce the results of a polygraph test conducted
solely by systolic blood pressure which vindicated him of the second de-
gree murder charges. The appellate court held that, to be admitted, the
polygraph "must be sufficiently established to have gained general accept-
ance in the particular field in which it belongs."" Placing it in the fields of
physiology and psychology, the court noted the polygraph's less than gen-
eral acceptance by experts in these fields. Ironically, Frye spent three years
in prison before he was cleared by the confession of a third person. 5
Criticism of Frye has been plentiful. McCormick feels that the general
scientific standard of Frye:
is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts but
not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant
conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness should
be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion."
Others contend that polygraphy is a science in itself and that the only
required acceptance should be that of the polygraph community, noting
that, "Not many psychologists or psychiatrists are actually in an advantag-
eous position to evaluate the lie detector. Very few have done any applied
work with it, or even experimental studies."" Mention is also made of
the increased sophistication of both the machine and its operators since
1923."
Despite these attacks on the rationale of Frye, the case has, with rare
exceptions,"9 been followed in Ohio and throughout the nation." The Ohio
Supreme Court, however, has hinted that the day may eventually come
when Ohio courts will admit polygraph results despite objections from op-
4"293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
"4d. at 1014.
5 State v. Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. 31, 45, (C.P. Cuyahoga 1977) citing N.Y. JuDIcrAU COUNCIm,
FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 265 (1948).
48 MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203 at 491 (2d ed. 1972).
4T Levitt, Scientific Evaluation of the "Lie Detector", 40 IowA L. REV. 440, 457 (1955).
4 State v. Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. at 33, 45.
49 United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D. D.C. 1972), rev'd per curium, 475 F.2d
1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972);
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 412, 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974); State v. Sims, 52
Ohio Misc. 31. Trial court discretion is allowed but apparently has never been exercised
in the 9th Circuit. United States v. DeBethan, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 907 (1973).
-United States v. Canada, No. 78-5099, 78-5125 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1978); Baker v. State,
265 Ind. 411, 355 N.E.2d 251 (1976); State v. Levert, 58 Ohio St. 2d 213, 389 N.E.2d 848
(1979). But see United States v. Mayers, 512 F.2d 637, 648 (6th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 14:1
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posing counsel.5' Unfortunately, the high court did not give any indication
as to what type of a showing would be needed to freely admit polygraph
evidence. They only stated, without explanation, that a claim that de-
fendant was denied his constitutional right of compulsory process for at-
taining witnesses in his behalf is an inadequate ground for admission."2
Ohio courts of appeals have held that exclusion of polygraph evidence
will be the rule in Ohio until its proponents can show an advancement in
the reliability of the polygraph's diagnosis," or until counsel can show its
"scientific recognition and public acceptance." 5' Notably, the latter test
did not mention whether the scientific recognition was to come from the
field of polygraphy itself or from the fields of physiology and psychology as
designated in Frye. These showings must be made on the record at the
point counsel lays his foundation for the introduction of the evidence. How-
ever, the trial court may refuse to even hear the profert. 5
III. THE RIGHT TO TAKE OR REFUSE A POLYGRAPH TEST
Frye has been narrowly interpreted so that it does not preclude every
courtroom use of the polygraph. Before approaching the court or the
prosecutor concerning the polygraph, a wise criminal attorney will first
have the test administered secretly to his client. The element of surprise
is most damaging when it comes from the defendant himself. Although
not conclusive, if a first test is passed it is likely that the accused will pass
a second test. Most prosecutors will assume a prior test has been taken
before they are contacted concerning one. Still, some will even accept the
results." For instance, Summit County, Ohio prosecutors are known to
accept the results of a prior test subject to their approving of the test ex-
aminer." This practice, however, has been questioned because of potential
inaccuracies caused by a lessened fear of detection.5 8
Various criminal defendants may encounter problems in obtaining a
prior test. Those defendants who are detained pending trial or who are in-
digent may often find it difficult to be tested in advance of any offer to the
court or prosecutor to take the test. Indigents can not afford the estimated
H "We are unconvinced that a departure from the safeguards enumerated in Souel [allowing
admission upon stipulation by both counsel] is required or would be wise at this time." (em-
phasis added) State v. Levert, 58 Ohio St. 2d at 215, 389 N.E.2d at 850.
52 Id.
63 State v. Smith, 50 Ohio App. 2d 183, 198, 362 N.E.2d 1239, 1248 (1976).
" State v. Moore, 47 Ohio App. 2d 181, 193, 353 N.E.2d 866, 876 (1973).
55 Id. Accord, United States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1976).
56 Axelrod, supra note 28, at 156.
57 Interview with Angelo Fanelly, attorney, in Akron, Ohio (March 4, 1980).
58 United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 514 (D. Md. 1973); Abbell, Polygraph Evi-
dence: The Case Against Admissibility in Federal Criminal Trials, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
29, 41-44 (1977).
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$250.00 test fee. Pre-trial detainees may be prevented access to the test
by their jailors.
A solution for the pre-trial detainee is to ask the federal court to
force jail authorities to allow him to be examined by a polygraph operator
of his choice. When the sixth and fourteenth amendment right to the ef-
fective assistance of counsel is at stake only legitimate security interests
will justify depriving an attorney of this access to his client. The arguments
for ordering the desired polygraph test are even more compelling when it
is pointed out that the defendant, not yet proven guilty, has been classified
on the basis of his inability to meet bail and irrationally denied the same
investigatory and tactical advantages as those defendants free on bail."'
Indigents generally do not fare as well. Although indigents represented
by the county public defender's office can take advantage of the polygraph
services of the state public defender, the indigent defended by appointed
counsel has no such recourse. Reported Ohio cases have not yet dealt
with the right of an indigent defendant to polygraphic services of his choos-
ing,"0 but past decisions involving other expert services make it doubtful
that the indigent will soon be extended this right."' Nevertheless, the criminal
bar should relentlessly pursue the right of their indigent clients to a secret,
prior polygraph test. Among the possible grounds for a constitutional claim are
due process, equal protection, effective assistance of counsel, compulsory
process and confrontation of witnesses.6 2
The complement to any real or theoretical right to take a polygraph
is the right not to take the test. Police departments regularly suggest the
polygraph to a suspect as a quick way to vindication without further in-
volvement in the criminal process. The United States Supreme Court, in
dicta, has stated that the polygraph is "essentially testimonial," ' making
the normal fifth amendment waiver rules applicable." Logically, if a de-
fendant is in custody, he must be given his Miranda rights before testing
59 Pinson v. Williams, 410 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
-Many police departments and prosecutors will provide an indigent with a free polygraph
test, generally administered by the police department. This practice, however, deprives the
indigent of the benefit of a prior secret test.
61 State v. Downs, 51 Ohio St. 2d 47, 364 N.E.2d 1140 (1977) (involving psychiatric testing);
Nolan v. State, 568 S.W.2d 837 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (denying polygraph testing for
an indigent).
62Despite The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976), which permits government
paid investigatory and expert services for indigents, the federal courts have, likewise, been
unreceptive to indigents' requests concerning polygraphs. Cherry v. Estelle, 424 F. Supp. 548
(N.D. Tex. 1976).
"s Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1965).
" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U,S, 436 (1966); People v. Sims, 395 Ill. 69, 69 N.E.2d 336
(1946).
(Vol. 14:1
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can proceed. 5 Before Ohio courts admit polygraphic evidence against a
pro se defendant, there must be an affirmative showing on the record that
the test was taken with full knowledge of his constitutional rights." The
better view is that prior to any testing which is later to be used in court,
the judge should advise the defendant of his rights and affirmatively de-
termine that his waiver is voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made,
regardless of any status as to counsel."7 Surely the same guardian rationale
for judicial inquiry that underlies Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (C)
and (D) and Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (C) and (D) in the
guilty plea setting would require such inquiry prior to polygraph tests as
well.
It has been suggested that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination can not be waived by submitting to the polygraph. There
are two rationales to this theory. The first is based on the fact that errors
do occur. The suspect who is mistakenly determined to be lying could not
have consented to that untruth. Since no one can determine when there is
a testing error, all such waivers are void.68 The second rationale is that
a person can never know the scope of his waiver because the test reveals
his unconscious mind. 9 These theories are without judicial support.
IV. PROBABLE CAUSE HEARINGS
The first point at which polygraphic evidence could be presented in
court in a criminal proceeding is at a probable cause hearing. Ohio has
no reported law on point. The limited case law at this stage of the pro-
ceedings in other jurisdictions is restricted to grand jury issues. Applying
the Frye rationale,"0 a New York county court dismissed a criminal in-
dictment based in part on polygraphic evidence.' This view finds support
in the American Bar Association Standards which do not permit evidence
inadmissible at trial to be submitted to the grand jury."
Generally, however, courts have been reluctant to overturn convictions
heard under a polygraph based indictment. Analogizing to the United
65 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. However, there seems to be no case law directly on
point.
Gs In Re Collins, 20 Ohio App. 2d 319, 253 N.E.2d 824 (1969).
67 The attorney himself may have a coercive effect on a client's decision to take a polygraph.
This can have an adverse effect on his rights and on the attorney-client relationship. Axelrod,
supra note 28, at 157-60.
e8 People v. Schiers, 160 Cal. App. 2d 364, 384, 329 P.2d 1, 4 (1958) (Carter, J., dissenting).
69 Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARv. L. REv. 683, 692 (1956).
70 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013.
71 People v. Dobler, 127 Misc. 75, 215 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1961).
12 ABA STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AN Tn DEFENSE FUNCTION, §§ 3.5(b),
3.6(a) (1971),
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States Supreme Court's acceptance of a hearsay based indictment,"8 some
courts will not invalidate an indictment because of the incompetence of
polygraph evidence considered by the grand jury." Other courts have
held that regardless of the propriety of the admission, the indictment
is later cleansed by a conviction not based on the incompetent evidence."
Although it would be ethically preferable for the prosecutor to caution
the grand jury as to any weaknesses of the polygraph, he has no duty to
do so as long as he has not "affirmatively misled the grand jury into at-
taching inordinate weight to the polygraph examination.""
The issue of whether a prosecutor must submit to the grand jury the
results of a polygraph test favorable to the accused, presents an interesting,
but as of yet uncontested, question. Clearly, for a court to find such a
duty, it must: 1) consider such evidence admissible to the grand jury;'7
2) acknowledge an affirmative duty on the part of the prosecutor to dis-
close exculpatory evidence to a grand jury; 8 and, 3) hold such evidence
exculpatory. Research has found no jurisdiction presently employing such
a combination.
V. BOND HEARINGS
Bond hearings are commonly overlooked as a vehicle to further a
client's interests via a polygraph's results. "A defendant who has passed
a polygraph test can intelligently argue to the trial court that he believes
the court will reach the same not guilty result as the polygraph, and
therefore he has no fear of returning to court, should be he released
on bond."7 The court should consider this evidence for several reasons.
It relates to the rationale for bail (i.e., to secure the appearance of the
defendant at trial)," and the normal rules of evidence are inapplicable to
bond hearings."1 Nevertheless, "if the state objects to the introduction of
the results, the court will presume that the polygraph results are favorable
to the defendant and probably act accordingly." 2
78 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
4United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
75 United States v. Callahan, 442 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Minn. 1978), rev'd, 596 F.2d 759 (8th
Cir. 1979).
TO Id. at 1219.
7 United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252. Query whether 'cleansed' evidence would
suffice.
TON.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-11(B); Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d
792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975).
g Axelrod, supra note 28, at 156.
0 Ono IL Cnam. P. 46(A).
81 Ono R. CPiM. P. 46(I).
8 Axelrod, supra note 28, at 157.
[Vol. 14:1
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VI. SUPPRESSION HEARINGS
Citing the general rule of inadmissibility at trial, courts have generally
not been receptive to the introduction of polygraphic evidence at suppression
hearings." This is unfortunate. Since polygraph testing is most reliable
when the examiner knows that one subject is clearly lying,"' issues such
as whether the defendant consented for a search are ideal for testing. As
it stands now, it is the word of a "criminal" against the word of a police-
man. The outcome is often dubious. The case of State v. Kasold"5 addresses
the only reported exception in this area. The Arizona Supreme Court held
that it is proper for polygraph test results to be considered in a hearing
to suppress the fruits of a search where the probable cause for a search
warrant was based in part on the test. Although not so stated by the court,
the evidence was probably admitted because it went to the heart of the
matter in issue (whether there was probable cause) rather than the truth
of the matter asserted (the veracity of the complainant).
VII. DISCOVERY OF POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
"Truth is best revealed by a decent opportunity to prepare in advance
of trial."8 The rules of discovery are based on this very premise. Since
discovery and the polygraph are both concerned with the truth, it is ironic
that they are often incompatible in the criminal justice system.
The Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure permit a defendant to discover
"any results . . . of scientific tests . . . made in connection with the
particular case.""7 Although there is no Ohio case law on point, this rather
broad provision appears to make the results of a polygraph test discoverable
by the defendant. However, an argument could be made that, to be con-
sidered a 'scientific test,' polygraphy must first be scientifically recognized.
Depending on which field the court places polygraphy into, the results
may be undiscoverable because of their lack of scientific acceptance.88
Even- assuming that discovery is unavailable under the Ohio Rules, it
may be allowed by the constitutional standards of Brady v. Maryland"9
and United States v. Agurs.90 Under the Brady-Agurs rule, if information is
8 United States v. Sockel, 478 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1973); Jordan v. State, 365 So. 2d 1198
(Miss. 1978).
84 Horvath and Reid, supra note 36, at 281.
85 110 Ariz. 563, 521 P.2d 995 (1974).
86 State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 136, 145 A.2d 313, 315 (1958), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 933
(1961).
8Omo R. CRIM. P. 16(B)(1)(d).
98 See supra notes 43, 44 and 47.
89 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
90 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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material to the guilt or punishment of the accused, or if it is obviously
exculpatory, it must be disclosed lest a due process violation occur. While
the fact that the state's key witness failed a polygraph test raises an in-
ference of perjury and thus seems to be material and exculpatory, the fact
that that information would have been inadmissible at trial allows the state
to withhold it from the defendant. 1 If the defendant, however, can show
that the test results would lead to additional evidence or aid in the prepa-
ration of his case, the test would then be material and the discovery would
be permitted."' When permitted, discovery has been held to include not
only the test results but also all the working materials of the examiner.93
Some attorneys may avoid polygraph tests because of fears of reciprocal
discovery.9" These fears are unfounded. In the first place, the rule only
applies to test results "which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence
at the trial, or which were prepared by a witness whom the defendant in-
tends to call at the trial, when such results or reports relate to his testi-
mony."9 " Thus, the defense attorney can keep the results of a bad polygraph
test secret by simply not introducing them at trial. This is no infringement on
the rights of the accused because there would be no reason to introduce bad
results into evidence. Also, since the test is "essentially testimonial,", the
results could not be elicited in violation of the defendant's fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination.
VIII. ADMISSION THROUGH STIPULATION
As discussed, the results of a polygraph examination are generally
not admitted at trial. The major exception to this rule is when both parties
stipulate to its admission. Although many courts note the polygraph's
unreliability and state that the rule against admissibility can not be cir-
cumvented by agreement," the trend is to accept the stipulated evidence
at trial. Ohio, in State v. Souel, 8 became one of at least twenty states ac-
cepting stipulations. Souel, accused of a robbery-murder, entered into a
written stipulation with the prosecutor which on its face permitted the re-
91 Inbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, 445 (1976) (White, J., concurring); Ballard v.
Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966); Zupp v. State,
258 Ind. 625, 283 N.E.2d 540 (1972).
92 Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302; Zupp v.
State, 258 Ind. 625, 283 N.E.2d 540.
93 Galloway v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1975).
9 4 0mo R. Cium. P. 16(C)(1)(b).
95ld.
96 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757.
97 Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474 (Alas. 1970).
98 53 Ohio St. 2d 123, 372 N.E.2d 1318 (1978).
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suits of a polygraph test to be introduced as evidence at the trial." Souel
was implicated in the crime by the test results and objected to their intro-
duction. The objection overruled, the prosecutor then called the polygraph
examiner to the stand who, before disclosing the test results, testified as
to his polygraph training and experience and also as to how the
test was administered to the defendant.00 On cross-examination, de-
fense counsel reviewed that testimony and further questioned the examiner
as to the conditions under which the test had been administered and the
various possibilities for error °10 The court's jury instruction emphasized
the point that the polygraph results should be weighed with all the other
evidence and that it can not in and of itself be deemed conclusive on any
point." 2 Souel was thereafter convicted.
Relying heavily on the Arizona case of State v. Valdez,' the Ohio
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The court, in its syllabus, held
that:
The results of a polygraphic examination are admissible in evidence
in a criminal trial for purposes of corroboration or impeachment, pro-
vided that the following conditions are observed:
(1) The prosecuting attorney, defendant and his counsel must sign
a written stipulation providing for defendant's submission to the
test and for the subsequent admission at trial of the graphs and
the examiner's opinion thereon on behalf of either defendant or the
state.
(2) Notwithstanding the stipulation, the admissibility of the test re-
sults is subject to the discretion of the trial judge, and if the trial
judge is not convinced that the examiner is qualified or that the
test was conducted under proper conditions he may refuse to
accept such evidence.
(3) If the graphs and examiner's opinion are offered in evidence the
opposing party shall have the right to cross-examine the examiner
respecting:
99 For examples of stipulations, see State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St. 2d at 124, 372 N.E.2d at
1319; State v. Towiis, 35 Ohio App. 2d 237, 243-44, 301 N.E.2d 700, 705-06 (1973);
Note, Admissibility of Polygraph ("Lie-Detector") Evidence Pursuant to Stipulation in
Criminal Proceedings, 5 AKRON L. REV. 235, 249-50 (1972); REID & INBAU, supra note 7, at
334-35.
100 This testimony should also include an explanation of the theory behind the polygraph.
For an example of a preferred direct examination, see FERGUSON & MILLER, supra note 3,
at 157-96.
101 For an example of a proper cross-examination, see Id. at 198-225.
102 Jury misuse of polygraphic evidence can also be prevented by the proper use of voir
dire. For an example of a recommended jury instruction, see Note, Insurmountable Barriers
for the Polygraph, 12 TuLsA L.J. 682, 696 (1977). Note that passing a polygraph examina-
tion does not in itself create a reasonable doubt of guilt. State v. Jenkins, 525 P.2d 1232
(Utah 1974).
203 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
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(a) the examiner's qualifications and training;
(b) the conditions under which the test was administered;
(c) the limitations of and possibilities for error in the technique
of polygraphic interrogation;
and,
(d) at the discretion of the trial judge, any other matter deemed
pertinent to the inquiry.
(4) If such evidence is admitted the trial judge should instruct the
jury to the effect that the examiner's testimony does not tend to
prove or disprove any element of the crime with which a de-
fendant is charged, and that it is for the jurors to determine what
weight and effect such testimony should be given.' "
These criteria are designed to "respond to the major objections to the
admission of polygraph evidence." ' 5 First, the reliability of a polygraph
test is more dependent on the examiner himself than on any other variable.
By stipulating to an examiner of their choice, the parties can arguably
screen out incompetent operators. Protection from inaccurate results is
further afforded by the court's additional screening power and by cross-
examination.' "The device of cross-examination soon smokes out the in-
ept, the unlearned, the inadequate self-styled expert."'", Second, the stipula-
tion quashes judicial debate over the accuracy of the polygraph and lays
the foundation for its probative value.'" Theoretically, the stipulation is
in the nature of a plea bargain. It is an agreement not to object to the
introduction of the evidence enforceable by a contract analogy or by public
faith and policy."0 9 Thus, without a proper objection, the evidence is ad-
mitted. Finally, proper jury instructions will reduce the chances of the
jury placing undue reliance on the test results.11
The Souel qualifications must be rigidly interpreted by Ohio courts.
Failure to do so will result in unfairness and disregard of Frye1 ' and Lev-
ert." ' The fear of 'trial by polygraph' should cause courts to guard against
uncorroborated polygraphic evidence. If the stipulation is not in writing,
it must be rejected. "[M]ore formality should be required to give effect to
104 State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St. 2d at 123, 372 N.E.2d at 1318-19.
105 Id. at 133, 372 N.E.2d at 1323.
106 Id.
10T Id. at 134, 372 N.E.2d at 1324, quoting Gullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445, 458, (Wyo. 1977).
108 Id. at 133, 372 N.E.2d at 1323.
10oPeople v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 235 N.W.2d 581 (1975). Cf. Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257 (1971).
'I' State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St. 2d at 133, 372 N.E.2d at 1323.
"' Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013.
112 State v. Levert, 58 Ohio St. 2d 213, 389 N.E.2d 848.
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an agreement of such importance."' 8 A writing further clarifies each party's
expectations. The stipulation must always be signed by the defendant, his
attorney and the prosecuting attorney. The defense attorney is necessary
for the protection of the defendant. Without advice from his counsel as
to the machine's reliability, his right not to take the test, etc., the defendant's
waiver could hardly be considered knowing, voluntary and intelligent.
Further, counsel can bargain for the defendant to gain favorable or at
least fair terms in the stipulation (e.g., submission to the test but not to
a post-test interrogation). The decision by the prosecutor not to stipulate
in any given case is his decision alone and should not be circumvented
by the court."' Since a report can not be cross-examined, it is essential
that the person who administered and interpreted the test be present at
trial.
There are two areas where courts have permitted variations in the
criteria for an admissible stipulation. Echoing the rationale for allowing
an agreement to introduce the results at trial, courts have upheld agreements
by the prosecutor to dismiss the charges if the defendant passes the test.
In People v. Reagan"' the prosecutor later found that the test results were
unreliable because of the defendant's schizophrenia. The Michigan high
court compelled the dismissal of the defendant's charges stating, "[I]t would
have been advisable, at the very least, that the prosecution acquaint itself
with the limitations of the polygraph before entering into an agreement to
dismiss the case on the basis of polygraph results.""' 6
The prosecutor could best protect the interests of the community by
employing the "introduce at trial" stipulation. While most defendants who
pass the test will be summarily dismissed, that stipulation, unlike the "dis-
miss the charges" stipulation, allows the prosecutor flexibility when newly
discovered circumstances call for continuing the litigation.
Finding no reason to treat a defendant and a witness differently, courts
have condoned stipulations when the person tested was merely a witness."
An occasional court has gone one step further, implying a stipulation when
the prosecution has a witness polygraphically tested, reasoning that the
prosecutor would not have had the witness take the test if he were not
satisfied with its results.1 8
r18 Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Ky. App. 1957).
114 State v. Forgan, 104 Ariz. 497, 455 P.2d 975 (1969).
115 395 Mich. 306, 235 N.W.2d 581.
116 Id. at 318, 235 N.W.2d at 587.
LT' State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974).
'is United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. N.Y. 1971); State v. Christopher, 134
N.J. Super. 263, 339 A.2d 239 (1975), rev'd, 149 N.J. Super. 269, 373 A.2d 705 (1977).
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IX. EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S WILLINGNESS OR
REFUSAL TO BE TESTED
Since without a proper stipulation "evidence of the result of a lie
detector test is inadmissible in a criminal case, evidence of suspect's [sic]
willingness or unwillingness to take such a test is also inadmissible.""' 9
Mention at trial by the defendant of an offer to submit to a polygraph test
is self-serving, since unfavorable results could not have been used against
him. 2° Comment upon defendant's failure to take a polygraph test is an
improper comment on the exercise of a right.'' Also, the bare refusal
may be more prejudicial than admitting test results along with evidence
as to the test's limitations.' Comment before the jury as to whether a
test was actually taken is likewise frowned upon." 3
However, the Ohio Supreme Court feels that an instruction to dis-
regard these remarks erases the tainted disclosure from the jury's collective
mind. Thus there is no prejudice."' The court, strangely, refutes its own
reasoning when it states, "such testimony was .. .no doubt damaging
to the defendant.""' Applying the cleansing instruction rationale, an Ohio
court of appeals held that despite the fact that a prosecutor told a detective
that his testimony could include the fact that a polygraph test was taken,
the officer had not been improperly coached. More disturbing, the court
continued its cleansing rationale, writing that, even had the prosecutor and
witness acted in bad faith, the result would have been the same since "we
are not concerned with something which happened of which the jury had
no knowledge."1"'
A Michigan case, People v. Johnson,"" contains an interesting applica-
tion of the cleansing instruction rule. There the prosecutor objected when
the defense attorney questioned a police officer as to the defendant's willing-
ness to submit to a polygraph examination. The trial judge, without the de-
fendant's consent, ordered a mistrial. The Michigan Supreme Court held
that reprosecution was barred by Double Jeopardy. Since mentioning the
polygraph was a mere irregularity which could have been cured by an
instruction, there should have been no mistrial. Once jeopardy attaches,
19 State v. Smith, 113 Ohio App. 461, 464, 178 N.E.2d 605, 608 (1960).
120 State v. Rowe, 77 Wash. 2d 955, 958-59, 468 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1970).
121 Cf. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
'12 State v. Hegal, 9 Ohio App. 2d 12, 222 N.E.2d 666 (1964).
123 State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St. 2d 81, 246 N.E.2d 365 (1969).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 84, 246 N.E.2d at 367.
126 State v. Collins, 60 Ohio App. 2d 116, 123, 396 N.E.2d 221, 226 (1977).
127 396 Mich. 424, 240 N.W.2d 729 (1976).
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only with the defendant's consent can a second prosecution be instituted
after an unnecessary mistrial, regardless of the trial judge's motivation.
Testimony concerning a witness' refusal to submit to a polygraph
may theoretically be sustained. If a showing can be made that the witness
believed the test to be dependable but refused to be tested, his refusal is
relevant in that it bears on his credibility. " 8
X. POLYGRAPH INDUCED CONFESSIONS
According to many polygraph operators, an examination is incomplete
without a post-test interview. 2 ' Here, the operator, often a former or present
law officer, attempts to elicit a confession from the subject. A confession
thereby eliminates concern over admission of the results. The examiner
plays on the fact that "[t]he entire testing procedure has a decided psy-
chological effect in convincing criminals to confess to the specific crime
under investigation."' 10 A popular technique is to tell the subject, regardless
of the test results, that the examination indicates deception. The operator
rationalizes as follows:
Some may question the ethics of such a procedure, but in the types
of crime in which the test is usually applied, it would seem that the
interests of justice outweigh the consideration of ethics, especially
in this country, where the defendant's legal rights are so thoroughly
protected.3
This and other tactics, although not as brutal as the old method of
beating out confessions which the polygraph was intended to replace, " 2
can be equally unreliable. " Illustrative is an incident concerning a young
bank officer who failed a polygraph test. "Believing that the polygraph
could not be wrong, he confessed to thefts that subsequent audits revealed
had not taken place.'
3
'
A criminal suspect has a fifth amendment right to remain silent.
While there may be times when a confession is in his best interests, during
a polygraph test is not one. It is the job of an attorney to protect his client's
rights and interests from overzealous and unethical polygraphists who feel
128 State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325, 184 A.2d 225 (1962).
2"9 ABRAMS, supra note 14, at 69.
13 0 ARTHER, supra note 1, at 27.
131 Axelrod, supra note 28, at 134, quoting C. LEE, THE INSTRUMENTAL DETECTION OP
DECEPTION 187 (1953).
132 Axelrod, supra note 28, at 110-11 and cited materials.
183 See supra notes 23 and 42.
134 Burley, The Case Against the Polygraph, 51 A.B.A.J. 855, 856 (1965), citing Dearman
& Smith, Unconscious Motivation and the Polygraph Test, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1017 (May,
1963).
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that the United States Constitution is a roadblock to justice. An attorney
can perform this task by following a few simple steps:
1) Know your operator. Reputations as to whether a given operator
attempts to elicit a confession or not are quickly earned and should not go
unheeded.
2) Enter into an agreement with the operator prohibiting interro-
gations. Those examiners who will not cooperate can be quickly forced
into such an agreement by market conditions such as a boycott of their
business by attorneys.
3) Instruct your client not to confess and, further, not to say anything
once the actual machine testing is completed.
4) Always remain in an adjoining room with a one-way mirror and
a sound receiver when your client is with a polygraphist. An attempt to
elicit a confession can be quickly concluded by a strong kick on the wall
followed by the attorney's appearance in the test room.
Unfortunately, not all defendants are fortunate enough to be repre-
sented by counsel at the time of a polygraph test. The police often suggest
the polygraph as a quick and simple way 'to clear up this mess,' before
an attorney can be secured.
The courts must provide these people with protection. Clearly, a
polygraph-induced confession is admissible in Ohio.'35 But that confession
must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. In addition, while
the confessor is in custody, any interrogation must be prefaced by a re-
cital of his Miranda rights." Conversely, if a suspect is not in Custody,
he need not be given the Miranda warning even though the police may
have been involved with the testing. 3 ' If a defendant is illegally in custody,
the Miranda warning does not legitimize a polygraph-induced confession.
His confession is excluded as a fruit of the illegal arrest.'"
The first recorded case allowing a polygraph-induced confession to
be admitted at trial did so with the condition that the confession was not
procured by tricks likely to cause an untruth." 9 By applying similar Ian-
"'State v. Chase, 55 Ohio St. 2d 237, 378 N.E.2d 1064 (1978). But see State v. Schliss,
86 Wis. 2d 26, 271 N.W.2d 619 (1979), where the court held that since the post-test interview
is just another phase of the test, a polygraph induced confession is inadmissible unless there
is a stipulation.
136 State v. Chase, 55 Ohio St. 2d 237, 378 N.E.2d 1064.
137 United States v. Montanye, 500 F.2d 411 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1027
(1974).
138 Commonwealth v. Brooks, 468 Pa. 547, 364 A.2d 652 (1976).
130 Commonwealth v. Hipple, 333 Pa. 33, 3 A.2d 353 (1939).
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guage to nonpolygraph confessions,"" Ohio seemed to accept that view.
Later cases from foreign jurisdictions refined the rule, holding that trickery
alone does not void polygraph-impelled confessions unless accompanied by a
threat or promise.' 1 An example of a threat can be found in Commonwealth v.
Starr,'" where the operator promised to show the test results to the judge
who would know that they were reliable. An examiner's post-test statement
that if the defendant confessed he "would probably more than likely re-
ceive probation" has been held to have been a promise which so overdrew
his free will that the confession must be excluded as not freely and vol-
untarily made.'
A more logical view is that police trickery or deception makes a con-
fession void because it is not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.
At the very least the deception should be a factor bearing on voluntariness.'
Miranda teaches us that "any evidence that the accused was threatened,
tricked or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did
not voluntarily waive his privilege."'4 " The Ohio Supreme Court, inter-
preting this statement in dicta has stated that:
"Cajolery," in this context, may be defined as the act of persuading
or deceiving the accused, with false promises or information, into re-
linquishing his rights and responding to questions posed by law en-
forcement officers.'"
Surely, a false statement to a subject that the polygraph detected a lie is
cajolery by the examiner and should be excluded.
Attempts have been made to show that a confession was voluntary
by introducing evidence that the defendant confessed upon being confronted
by his deceptive polygraph results. The evidence was admitted in Tyler v.
United States "' as relevant to the circumstances leading to the confession
but not to the correctness of the test or the statement. A limiting instruction,
of course, was given to the jury. State v. Green,'" on the other hand, stands
for the proposition that this relevance is outweighed by the danger of
prejudice to the defendant by the jury knowing or inferring that the de-
fendant failed a polygraph test.
1,0 Burchett v. State, 35 Ohio App. 463, 172 N.E.2d 555 (1930).
', People v. McGuffiin, 55 A.D.2d 772, 389 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1976).
142 406 A.2d 1017 (Pa. 1979).
143 State v. Franks, 239 N.W.2d 588 (Iowa 1976).
1,4 Schmidt v. Hewitt, 573 F.2d 794 (3rd Cir. 1978).
14' Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 476.
146 State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St. 2d 31, 39, 358 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (1976).
'47 193 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 908' (1952).
14' 271 Or. 153, 531 P.2d 245 (1974).
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XI. POST-TRIAL USE OF POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
Even after the trial has ended, there are still times when the polygraph
may become an issue. Some judges will, prior to sentencing, extend an op-
portunity to the defendant to take a polygraph test on the:
rare occasions where there has been a violent reaction and a strong
protest against a finding of guilt and it was a matter of veracity between
the parties, particularly in some sex cases where there was the word
of one against the other." 9
At least one state bans this practice by statute.' Other states, through
their appeals courts, will order a new trial in this situation. By making this
offer, the trial court raises an inference that guilt had not been established
beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Polygraph evidence pertaining to issues not in issue at trial have been
admitted during sentencing hearings. In State v. Jones'5' the Arizona high
court encouraged the trial court's utilization of the polygraph concerning
an unrelated rape in an attempt to individualize the sentence. In considering
whether to revoke a pre-sentence release, a New Jersey court likewise ad-
mitted test results:
to show facts not decided by the trial jury or material to their de-
liberations-for example, to show his attitude, obedience to instruc-
tions of the court, and disprove accusations he has not been tried for."5
The court felt that this was no longer an adversarial stage and that it was
its duty to have the best available information concerning every aspect of
the defendant's life before it.'5"
The final area where a defendant may wish to utilize polygraphic
evidence is when he is petitioning the court for a new trial.' In the only
recently reported Ohio case on point, the Court of Appeals for Carroll
County concluded that a post-conviction polygraph test taken by the de-
fendant which exonerated him was not newly discovered evidence. 5 Had
the defendant wanted the test results to be considered he:
could have easily offered this type of evidence at the time of his trial,
and if the admission of such had been prohibited by the trial court,
149 Brown v. State, 28 Wis. 2d 383, 390, 137 N.W.2d 53, 56-57 (1965).
150 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-11 (Smith-Hurd).
161 Meyer v. State, 25 Wis. 2d 418, 130 N.W.2d 848 (1964).
152 110 Ariz. 546, 521 P.2d 978 (1974).
151 State v. Watson, 115 N.J. Super. 213, 219, 278 A.2d 543, 546 (1971).
'154 Id.
'55 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.80 (Page 1975).
158 State v. Jaroszyk, 39 Ohio App. 2d 35, 315 N.E.2d 521 (1973).
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he could have protected the record by proffering said evidence, and
these matters could have then been determined by a direct appeal."5 '
Although the appellate court did not pursue the matter in detail,
their decision was proper under Ohio Revised Code Annotated Section
1945.80. Under that statute, evidence sufficient to require a new trial
must be: 1) material; 2) newly discovered; and, 3) could not with reason-
able diligence have been earlier discovered. Inadmissible at a new trial,
the evidence is immaterial because nothing new would be added to the
second trial."' Further, evidence available to the defendant at any time upon
his taking a test, can hardly be considered newly discovered evidence which
could not, with reasonable diligence, have been earlier discovered.'59
CONCLUSION
An artisan must know his tools-their common uses, their potential
and their limitations. This comment, in considering the criminal attorney as
an artisan, has dissected the uses, potential and limitations of the polygraph.
The polygraph has a place in the criminal justice system. That place is in
aiding the court in its noble search for the truth. It is an attorney's duty
to his client and to his society to present the court with this valuable tool.
JOHN A. TURLIK
"1 Id. at 138, 315 N.E.2d at 523-24.
15 B State v. Scott, 210 Kan. 426, 502 P.2d 753 (1972). (accord in result only). Michigan,
however, allows this evidence when it is buffered by other nonpolygraphic evidence. People
v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977).
159 McCroskey v. United States, 339 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1965).
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